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Majority	(mis)rule	and	the	problem	with	naturalisation
for	UK	citizens	in	the	EU
Will	Britons	living	in	other	EU	member	states	have	the	opportunity	to	naturalise?	Dora
Kostakopoulou	says	this	would	be	a	potentially	fraught	and	divisive	policy	option,	particularly	for
those	living	in	states	that	do	not	allow	joint	citizenship.	Instead,	she	argues,	we	should	reconsider
the	legitimacy	of	a	narrow	majority	vote	that	deprived	millions	of	EU	citizens,	UK	and	non-UK,	of
fundamental	rights	and	freedoms.
Would	naturalisation	in	their	country	of	residence	be	a	suitable	policy	option	for	UK	nationals	who
are	living	in	EU	member	states?	In	answering	the	question,	I	make	a	basic	assumption:	that	the	principle	of	majority
rule	in	public	policy	formation	and	law	making	is	only	one	of	the	main	conditions	of	democracy.	The	other	two	are
respect	for	the	rule	of	law	and	the	protection	of	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms,	which	are	often	constitutionally
enshrined.	In	fact,	the	latter	two	conditions	guide,	shape	and	circumscribe	electoral	majoritarianism.
In	this	respect,	making	the	latter	the	only	and/or	the	overriding	consideration	makes	it	harder,	not	easier,	to	provide
an	adequate	justification	that	a	decision	or	a	policy	is	democratic.	To	put	it	differently,	the	principle	of	majority	rule
does	not	have	an	unlimited	scope	in	constitutional	democracies:	it	excludes	the	power	to	alter	rights	and	fundamental
freedoms,	or	to	deprive	numerical	minorities	of	their	rights.
Dutch	naturalisation	ceremony	in	Amsterdam,	2011.	Photo:	Kennisland	via	a	CC-BY-SA	2.0
licence
This	thinking	applies	to	the	Leave	vote	in	the	EU	referendum	outcome,	and	the	Prime	Minister’s	decision	to	make	it
an	authoritative	mandate	for	Brexit.	For	the	(slim)	majority’s	preference	for	the	UK	to	‘take	back	control’	–	whatever
this	might	mean	–	and	thus	leave	the	EU	was	not	properly	weighed	against	the	loss	of	citizenship	and	residence
rights	by	millions	of	EU	citizens.	Nor	was	the	possible	diminution	in	rights	protection	for	all	UK	citizens	and	residents
post-Brexit	at	the	forefront	of	any	concerns	before	and	after	the	referendum.
Leaving	aside	my	uneasiness	about	the	existence	of	a	democratic	deficit	if	a	slim	majority	can	make	authoritative
decisions	which	can	injure	significantly	a	portion	of	the	community	and	deprive	it	of	their	rights,	including	citizenship
rights,	by	referendums	–	thereby	evading	the	channels	of	accountability	before	representative	assemblies	–	I	would
like	to	counsel	caution	to	those	who	think	that	a	gesture	of	allowing	the	naturalisation	of	all	those	citizens	affected	by
Brexit	could	provide	an	adequate	compensatory	mechanism	for	the	cancellation	of	EU	citizenship	and	residency
rights.
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First,	naturalisation	laws	in	the	28	Member	States	vary,	which	would	result	in	divergence	and	inequalities	in	the
treatment	of	EU	citizens.	So	do	processing	times	and	naturalisation	rates	across	the	Union.
Secondly,	in	those	member	states	that	do	not	permit	dual	or	multiple	nationality,	the	voluntary	acquisition	of	the
nationality	of	that	state	will	result	in	the	loss	of	their	original	member	state	nationality,	thereby	placing	certain	EU
citizens	in	an	invidious	position.	In	an	interconnected	and	mobile	world,	EU	citizens	tend	to	maintain	their	attachment
to	their	country	of	origin	where	they	have	close	family	members	and/or	property.	Interestingly,	in	the	EU,	22	member
states	permit	multiple	nationality,	while	Denmark,	Norway,	Estonia	and	Lithuania	require	the	renunciation	of	the
former	nationality	upon	the	voluntary	acquisition	of	their	nationalities	–	without	exceptions.
Thirdly,	it	would	be	difficult	to	justify	the	conversion	of	EU	citizens	into	nationals	through	tests,	classes,	oaths	and
citizenship	ceremonies.	The	new	taxonomy	of	citizenship	consisting	of	the	‘ins’	and	‘outs’	will	be	seen	to	be	an
unnecessary	and	costly	imposition	on	all	those	citizens	affected	by	Brexit	who	have	been	incorporated	into	host
societies,	and	have	been	treated	as	rightful	participants	until	now.
It	is	also	likely	to	damage	societal	relations	and	create	narratives	of	‘othering’,	since	current	members	would	be	seen
as	unworthy	of	membership	unless	they	naturalise.	Creating	hierarchical	relations	which	treat	existing	members
having	a	secure	residence	and	free	movement	rights	as	non-members	–	and	thus	as	inferior	–	entails	a	denial	of
recognition	and	respect.	In	addition,	by	creating	a	new	positional	relativity	which	would	invite	executive	discretion,
that	is,	the	rejection	of	naturalisation	applications	from	EU	citizens	who	are	deemed	to	be	‘undesirable’	or	‘not	yet
ready	for	full	inclusion	and	citizenship’,	the	evolutionary	sequence	of	naturalisation	may	look	at	first	sight
incorporative	–		but,	in	reality,	is	founded	on	distancing,	separation	and,	quite	likely,	on	discrimination.
Exempting	UK	nationals	from	the	normal	naturalisation	procedures	and	facilitating	their	automatic	or	semi-automatic
naturalisation	by	registration	or	by	declaration	of	option	are	certainly	preferable.	This	would	require	an	application	for
citizenship,	but	the	process	would	be	quick,	more	inclusive	and	non-discretionary.	The	EU	member	states	could	in
theory	still	require	residency	requirements	and	the	absence	of	a	criminal	record.	They	could	also	differentiate	among
periods	of	residence.	For	instance,	residence	for	a	period	exceeding	ten	years	could	prompt	automatic	naturalisation,
while	shorter	periods	of	residence	would	activate	semi-automatic	naturalisation.	Naturalisation	by	declaration	of
option,	on	the	other	hand,	would	grant	EU	citizens	the	possibility	of	opting	out	from	national	citizenship	if	they	wish	to
retain	or	not	to	compromise	in	any	other	way	their	national	citizenship.
Although	there	are	important	differences	among	the	policy	options	mentioned	above,	the	latter	is	more	normatively
defensible	-bearing	in	mind	EU	citizens’	existing	rights	and	effective	links	with	the	societies	of	residence.	However,
even	this	option	does	not	answer	adequately	the	question	why	national	citizenship	should	be	superimposed	on	EU
citizenship,	thereby	(re-)making	nationality	the	basis	of	political	membership	and	identity	in	contemporary	Europe.
Let	me	conclude	by	returning	to	the	difficulty	I	identified	in	the	opening	paragraphs	of	this	post:	namely,	that	the
unrestrained	operation	of	the	principle	of	majority	rule	subverts,	rather	than	advances,	democratic	political	processes.
Certainly,	when	a	‘pro-Leave’	majoritarian	decision	leads	to	millions	of	people	being	deprived	of	their	rights,
effectively	undermining	their	life	worlds	and	the	future	of	their	families,	then	there	is	no	reason	for	thinking	that	it
deserves	to	be	respected	by	all	those	who	believe	in	the	value	and	the	rights-affirming	nature	of	constitutional
democracy.
The	domestic	electoral	cost	of	aborting	Brexit	cannot	outweigh	the	political	costs	of	damaging	democratic
constitutionalism	and	cancelling	rights.	Nor	can	it	compensate	for	the	unnecessary	hardship	inflicted	upon	millions	of
individuals,	including	1.2m	British	nationals	living	in	the	European	Union.	It	would	be	highly	imprudent	to	consent	to,
or	accept,	such	a	(slim)	majority	misrule.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author,	who	is	writing	in	a	personal	capacity,	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,
not	the	LSE.
Dora	Kostakopoulou	is	Professor	of	European	Law,	European	Integration	and	Public	Policy	at	the	University	of
Warwick.
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